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A FRESH LOOK AT PREMISES LIABILITY AS




For centuries, the law of landlord premises liability was marked by
consistency and predictability. Not only were authorities in agreement as
to the content of the law, but there was also universal consent as to the
underlying rationales. This state of the law, developed in feudal England,
was transported to this country and remained basically unchanged until
well into the current century.
Recent years, however, have been marked by upheaval and instability.
The law of premises liability, once so firmly based on the estate convey-
ance theory, is now being unsettled by concepts of contract, warranty,
negligence, and strict liability. As a result, the landlord in many jurisdic-
tions can no longer rely on traditional immunity but instead must respond
to increased duties owing to tenants. In many jurisdictions, courts face a
considerable task in defining the scope of these increased duties, since
they must struggle to accommodate the various available bases.
This article will present the different positions that courts have taken
during these recent years of experimentation in landlord premises liabil-
ity, discuss how courts have become muddled in sorting out the various
theories, and propose a system of liability that would be fair and soundly
based on modem policy considerations. We shall first place the question
in context by considering the traditional theories of liability. We will then
discuss the statutory impact on landlord responsibility and consider the
recent tort and warranty theories that set the stage for the period of experi-
mentation.
Our ultimate objective is to arrive at ,a proposal that we feel is work-
able, combining and reconciling various theories that courts have recently
considered. Specifically, we shall propose a theory of liability that is not
based solely on the question of who had control over the defective item
causing the injury, but one that also considers the discoverability of the
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defect and whether the defect arose before or after the beginning of the
lease. This will present a system of premises liability that is more rational
and less arbitrary than the traditional view. It will be a step toward resolv-
ing the confusion that has arisen in recent years in this area of premises
liability.
1. CLASSIC TORT THEORY
Although leases of real property were initially considered contractual
arrangements,' the view soon developed that a lease was essentially the
conveyance of an estate. As early as the sixteenth century courts had de-
termined that the lease was primarily a matter of property, not con-
tractual, significance. 2 This characterization led directly to several princi-
ples of landlord-tenant law that went fundamentally unexamined for
much of the next four hundred years. 3
A significant effect of this development took place in the general area
of premises liability, the legal responsibility to answer for damage or
harm that occurred on leased property. As the lease came to be regarded
as a conveyance of premises, the tenant came to be viewed as the
"owner" of those premises, subject to many of the responsibilities of
ownership. The landlord retained only a reversionary interest, and had no
more right to enter the premises without permission of the tenant than a
stranger. 4 Possession and control of the premises were entirely the ten-
ant's. Because the premises were "sold" for the term, courts applied the
doctrine of caveat emptor to the transaction, leaving the landlord with no
responsibility for defective conditions that may have existed at the time of
1. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 221[1], at 179 (rev. ed. 1973); 1 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 3.11, at 202 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as ALP]; 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND. THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 36 (1898).
2. 2 R. POWELL. supra note 1, $ 221[1], at 179; 1 ALP, supra note 1, § 3.11, at 202.
3. From this characterization was derived the notion that lease covenants were independent of
each other. Breach of a covenant by one of the parties did not excuse breach of a different covenant
by the other party. E.g., Brown v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864) (the lessor may not terminate the lease
for failure to pay rent); Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938) (breach of a land-
lord's covenant to repair no defense to an action for rent); Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 58 (1809) (the
obligation to pay rent in a lease continues although the building is destroyed).
Since leases were not considered to be contractual agreements, the doctrine of anticipatory breach
was inapplicable. The landlord, by this view, could not sue for rent until after it became due. Phillips-
Hollman, Inc. v. Peerless Stages, Inc., 210 Cal. 253, 291 P. 178 (1930); Hermitage Co. v. Levine,
248 N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928).
Also, a landlord had no duty to mitigate damages when the tenant abandoned the premises. Con-
trary to the requirement of mitigation in contract law, the landlord could allow the property to remain
vacant and sue for rent as it accrued. Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518 (1876), is a leading case.
4. Borders v. Roseberry, 216 Kan. 486, 532 P.2d 1366 (1975); W. PROSSER. HANDBOOK OFTHE
LAW OF TORTS § 63, at 400 (4th ed. 1971).
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the lease. The tenant-owner was, of course, responsible for maintenance
and repair during the term. The upshot of these circumstances and conclu-
sions was that the landlord was generally immune from liability for tor-
tious occurrences on the premises.
The conceptual basis of this immunity was reinforced by the social and
economic realities of the transaction. The medieval tenant was an agrar-
ian specialist, undoubtedly more competent in inspecting the premises
and effecting necessary repairs than his manor-born landlord. Generally,
no sophisticated or complicated technological aspects of the premises re-
quired specialized knowledge, but if such knowledge was necessary, the
tenant would have been as likely to possess it as the landlord. The objects
of repair were totally accessible to the tenant, and because he leased for
an extended term the tenant logically had a strong interest in keeping the
premises in good repair. Most importantly, the principal interest of the
tenant was to obtain a productive tract of land for fanning purposes, with
the existence or condition of any improvements of incidental importance.
While landlord immunity was thus born from the conceptual notion of
lease as conveyance and nurtured by the economic and social conditions
of Tudor England, it grew strong and hardy through the addition of a
fairness argument peculiar to the premises liability sector of landlord-ten-
ant law. The landlord should not be responsible, the courts held, because
he had no control over the-premises. 5 Surely, even today it seems
overwhelmingly equitable to shield the owner of premises from liability
for what happens after another person takes possession of the premises,
especially if the owner has divested himself of his entire interest in the
parcel, including the right of entry. The one obvious flaw is the existence
of a condition on the premises, known to the landlord but undiscoverable
by the tenant, that later leads to harm or injury. That one flaw led to the
first exception to the general immunity rule: the "known but concealed
condition" exception. Under that exception, the landlord could be held
liable for damage or injury resulting from a latent defect of which the
landlord was aware but which he failed to disclose to the tenant. 6 The
rationale for this exception may have had a fraud-based origin, but it was
soon reconciled with the caveat emptor doctrine through holdings that the
5. Korach v. Loeffel, 168 Mo. App. 414, 151 S.W. 790 (1912); Hollman v. Kayell Realty Co.,
120 Misc. 546, 199 N.Y.S. 39 (1923); Berlin v. Wall, 122 Va. 425, 95 S.E. 394 (1918).
6. Anderson v. Shuman, 257 Cal. App. 2d 272, 64 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1967); Miner, Read & Gar-
rette v. McNamara, 81 Conn. 690, 72 A. 138 (1909); Wright v. Peterson, 259 Iowa 1239, 146
N.W.2d 617 (1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY § 17.1 (1976); see also Eldredge, Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair, 84 U. PA. L.
REV. 467 (1936); Note, Landlord and Tenant-Liability of Landlord to Persons on the Premises-
The "ConcealedDefects" Exception, 49 MICH. L. REv. 1082 (1951).
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tenant retained the burden of inspecting the premises and discovering rea-
sonably discoverable defects. 7
This "known but concealed" exception was one of a small handful of
exceptions that emerged over the years. 8 In developing each of these ex-
ceptions, courts demanded that the exception be reconciled with the con-
trol theory. Courts even found a way to tie the covenant to repair excep-
tion to the control theory, although the two initially seemed inconsistent.
Their rationale was that, when the landlord undertakes the obligation to
repair, he also retains the privilege to enter the premises in order to assess
the need for repairs and to effect them. 9 With respect to this and to each of
the other exceptions, courts felt compelled to preserve the caveat emptor
underpinnings of the landlord-tenant relationship by finding some ele-
ment of control.
The general immunity doctrine and its few exceptions constituted the
evolving common law for several centuries. The landlord was immune
unless one of the exceptions could be proved. As will be seen, these doc-
trines retain significant vitality even today. 10 But change finally came,
first in the economic and social conditions underlying the conceptual
basis of immunity, and later in the law itself. Twentieth-century tenants
often live in multiple-unit dwellings where inspection of even the signifi-
cant systems serving them is not possible. Short-term leases predominate,
undermining the incentive to repair. Highly technical, centralized sys-
tems defy amateur repair and require significant capital expenditures.
Most important, the basic expectation of the great majority of modem
tenants is "a well known package of goods and services-a package
which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat,
7. Daulton v. Williams, 81 Cal. App. 2d 70, 183 P.2d 325 (1947); Shegda v. Hartford-Connecti-
cut Trust Co., 131 Conn. 186, 38 A.2d 668 (1944); Kurtz v. Pauly, 158 Wis. 534, 149 N.W. 143
(1914); see also Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence or
Strict Liability?, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 19, 51.
8. See generally Love, supra note 7, at 49-78; see also W. PROSSER. supra note 4, § 56-64, at
339-412. These exceptions are stated by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) as follows: (1)
where the lessor contracts to repair (§ 357); (2) where the injury results from an undisclosed danger-
ous condition known to the lessor (§ 358); (3) where the premises have been leased for purposes
involving admission of the public (§ 359); (4) where the injury results from a defective part of the
premises retained by the lessor but which the lessee is entitled to use (§ 360); (5) where the defective
part is retained by the lessor but is necessary to the safe use of the leased part (§ 361); and (6) where
the injury results from a negligent repair by the lessor (§ 362).
9. Fiomtino v. Mason. 233 Mass. 451, 124 N.E. 283, 283-84 (1919); accord Crowe v. Bixby,
237 Mass. 249, 129 N.E. 433 (1921) (applying rule set forth in Fiorntino); Note, Lessor's Duty to
Repair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62 HARV. L. REV. 673-74 & n.40 (1949).
10. See infra notes 77-80, 127-37, and accompanying text.
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light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and
doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance." 1'
These changes and the reactions to them, first by legislatures, then by
courts, have occupied most of the history of landlord-tenant law in this
century. For the first fifty years, legislatures predominated, with courts
trailing along to insure that nothing created by statute worked to under-
mine seriously the several centuries of development in the common law.
II. 1900-1950: STATUTORY CHANGES CONCERNING
PREMISES LIABILITY
In the first half of this century, state legislatures enacted statutes impos-
ing duties upon landlords concerning the maintenance of leased premises.
These duties ranged from a general duty to keep the premises in good
repair 12 to such specific duties as maintenance of a burning light in com-
mon hallways 13 or provision of "a suitable privy or water closet." 14 Be-
cause many of these statutes were enabling rather than self-executing, the
question soon arose whether these statutes could be the basis for the eradi-
cation of aspects of the landlord's traditional immunity.
Judicial responses took one of two general forms. Johnson v. Carter15
is often cited as the prototype of that strong majority of cases holding that
landlord immunity was unaffected by such legislation. In Johnson the
plaintiff's claim for personal injury, based on the alleged violation of
such a statute, was rejected. The Supreme Court of Iowa noted the com-
I1. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
12. E.g., Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624, 169 A. 912, 913 (1933) ("each building used as a
tenement, lodging or boarding house and all parts thereof shall be kept in good repair"); Palmigiani
v. D'Argenio, 234 Mass. 434, 125 N.E. 592, 592 (1920) ("every structure and part thereof and
appurtenant thereto shall be maintained in such repair as not to be dangerous"); Annis v. Britton, 232
Mich. 291, 205 N.W. 128, 129 (1925) ("every dwelling and all parts thereof shall be kept in good
repair by the owner"); see also Goldkopf v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 149 Misc. 663, 268 N.Y.S.
126 (1933); Tucker v. Wagner, 132 Misc. 402, 229 N.Y.S. 769 (1928).
13. McGowan v. Morgan, 160 A.D. 588, 145 N.Y.S. 787 (1914); accord Harris v. Joffe, 28
Cal. 2d 418, 170 P.2d 454 (1946) (statute requiring lessor to keep common passageway lighted).
14. Hamilton v. Baugh, 335 II1. App. 346, 82 N.E.2d 196 (1948); accord Hull v. Bishop-Stod-
dard Cafeteria, 26 N.W.2d 429 (Iowa 1946) (statute requiring lessor to keep elevators in safe operat-
ing condition).
15. 218 Iowa 587, 255 N.W. 864 (1934). The pertinent statute required that the leased premises
"be kept in good repair by the owner" and that "the roof shall be kept so as not to leak and all rain
water shall be so drained and conveyed therefrom as not to cause dampness in the walls or ceilings."
IOWA CODE § 6392 (1931) (repealed Jan. 1, 1981). Plaintiff alleged that a basement wall of his leased
home had been negligently repaired and further weakened by water seepage. The wall eventually
collapsed, injuring the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued in tort, but the trial court granted the defendant's
demurrer and the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed.
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mon-law rule of nonliability, looked to the statute16 for any changes in
this rule, and found that "the only liability imposed for violation of this
provision of the statute is penal in its nature." 17 Similarly, in Chambers
v. Lowe18 the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, while admitting that
statutory language requiring premises "to be kept in good repair" was
theoretically broad enough to provide a tort claim for personal injury,
nevertheless applied the common-law rule.
Both decisions pointed out that the statutes in question failed to provide
expressly for a civil cause of action for the tenant. Most courts concurred
that such an omission was a reflection of legislative intent not to deviate
from common-law landlord immunity.19 But Chambers also made clear
that the control doctrine was an equally important basis for the decisions.
In Chambers the court determined that regulation of "tenement, lodging
and boarding houses" did not affect responsibilities for the apartments
within those buildings because those were areas over which the landlord
had no control. 20
The courts of New York and Michigan offered a contrasting view of
the general issue. Beginning with the landmark case of Altz v. Leiber-
son, 21 a series of New York decisions imposed civil liability upon land-
lords for breach of statutory duties leading to damage or injury. 22 In Lei-
berson, in which plaintiff sought damages for personal injury, Judge
Cardozo declared that the New York tenement house law had "changed
the ancient rule." ,23 As in other states, this statute simply required that the
premises be kept in good repair. Nevertheless, Cardozo found that this
statutory requirement undermined the control doctrine which provided the
basis for immunity. It followed that the legislature must have been moti-
vated to change the common law.
The court went on to substantiate its decision by finding that the statute
also implicitly allowed a civil cause of action:
16. IOWA CODE § 6392 (1931) (repealed Jan. 1, 1981).
17. Johnson, 255 N.W. at 866.
18. 117 Conn. 624, 169 A. 912 (1933).
19. Most of the statutes provided for penal, but not civil, iability. No state had an express provi-
sion for personal injury or property damage liability. Some cases emphasized this, stating that the
penal measures were the exclusive means of enforcement. E.g., Hallock v. Smith, 207 Ala. 567, 93
So. 588 (1922); Vallen v. Cullen, 238 Mass. 145, 130 N.E. 216 (1921); Newman v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 77 N.D. 466,43 N.W.2d 411 (1950).
20. Chambers, 169 A. at 913.
21. 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
22. Morris v. City of New York, 146 Misc. 36, 261 N.Y.S. 228 (1932); Tucker v. Wagner, 132
Misc. 402, 229 N.Y.S. 769 (1928); Wechsler v. United Produce Dealers Ass'n, 126 Misc. 563, 214
N.Y.S. 136 (1926). Contra Israel v. Toonkel, 134 Misc. 327, 235 N.Y.S. 285 (1929); Block v.
Baldan Realty Co., 129 Misc. 906, 223 N.Y.S. 518 (1927).
23. Leiberson, 134 N.E. at 704.
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We may be sure that the framers of this statute, when regulating tenement
life, had uppermost in thought the care of those who are unable to care for
themselves. The Legislature must have known that unless repairs in the
rooms of the poor were made by the landlord, they would not be made by
any one. The duty imposed became commensurate with the need. The right
to seek redress is not limited to the city or its officers. The right extends to
all whom there was a purpose to protect. 24
Despite the stature of the author of the Leiberson opinion and its con-
sistent following in that state, the New York position has been a relatively
lonely one, although it has received some support from Michigan. Three
years after Leiberson, the Michigan Supreme Court also held that a plain-
tiff had a cause of action for personal injury for breach of a statute requir-
ing landlords to keep their premises in good repair. 25 That court held that
the statute imposes a duty of care on the landlord, the breach of which
constitutes negligence per se.26
Even at the midpoint of the century, however, most courts continued to
adhere to the common law in the face of increasingly specific statutes. 27
Plaintiffs continued to urge that these statutes imposed a duty of care
upon the landlord, the breach of which provided the basis for a civil cause
of action for personal injury. Most states continued to disagree, opting to
adhere to the common law unless compelled to do otherwise by the ex-
press language of the statute:
Unless there is a direct liability imposed upon the landlord these statutes are
generally held not to alter the common law relationship of landlord and ten-
ant, but merely to give the tenant a right of action to enforce better housing
conditions. It is generally held that such statutes are not to be extended by
implication. 28
Except in New York and Michigan, the traditional immunity rule held
firm despite the many legislative enactments. The majority rule could
have been otherwise, however, for the control doctrine does not ineluct-
ably lead to the conclusions reached by the majority. But midway through
the the twentieth century Johnson v. Carter and its kin were clearly the
rule, and Altz v. Leiberson clearly the exception. The New York and
Michigan views would prove to be prophetic, however, as changes in the
next two decades would confirm their more liberal position.
24. Id.
25. Annis v. Britton, 232 Mich. 291,205 N.W. 128 (1925).
26. See also Morningstar v. Strich, 326 Mich. 541, 40 N.W.2d 719 (1950); Malosh v. Thomp-
son, 265 Mich. 320, 251 N.W. 346 (1933).
27. See, e.g., Newman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 77 N.D. 466,43 N.W.2d 411 (1950).
28. 43 N.W.2d at 416; see also Callahan v. Loughran, 102 Cal. 476, 36 P. 835 (1894); Palmigi-
ani v. D'Argenio, 234 Mass. 434, 125 N.E. 592 (1920).
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III. 1950-1970: CHANGING ASSUMPTIONS WITHIN COMMON-
LAW TORT THEORY
During the 1950's and 1960's, much occurred to alter the relative posi-
tions of landlord and tenant. The landlord, at one time protected from
liability by the shield of caveat emptor, found himself subject to increased
responsibility as more and more courts came to apply first tort and then
"warranty" principles to premises liability cases. The tenant, formerly
the victim of a control doctrine that allowed recovery only under narrow
exceptions, came to be the beneficiary of what many courts saw as a less
mechanical view taking into account all circumstances. Courts began to
base civil causes of action for personal injury on statutes that imposed
duties on landlords regarding upkeep of leased premises, even when the
statutes did not expressly provide for such causes of action.
This movement for expanded landlord liability was induced in part by
the proliferation during that period of municipal housing codes. While the
first code was adopted in 1901 by the City of New York, the move to
widespread adoption took place after 1954. The move began when the
administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Administration inter-
preted a congressional mandate that communities applying for certain ur-
ban renewal and other funds have a "workable program" for community
betterment to require that the applicant community adopt a housing
code. 29 This connection with slum prevention and prevention of other
forms of physical blight reflected the view that such codes were intended
to protect buildings, not the people within-an outlook consonant with
previous interpretations of state dwelling repair laws. 30 This view was
reinforced by omission from standard codes of any reference to private
rights. 3 1 Nevertheless, a series of decisions evolved holding that private
relationships were indeed altered.
A. 1950-1970: The Growing Effect of Statutes and Ordinances on Tort
Responsibility of the Landlord
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued
a significant early opinion signaling change in this area of landlord-tenant
relations. In Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co. 32 the court stated:
29. Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, § 303, 68 Stat. 623 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1451(c) (1978)); Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM,
L. REV 1254, 1260 n.19(1966).
30. Gribetz & Grad, supra note 29, at 1259-60.
31. E.g., Tenement House Act, 1901 N.Y. Laws ch. 334.
32. 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960). In this case, the plaintiff-tenant occupied one unit in an
apartment house owned by the defendant in the District of Columbia. Four months prior to the plain-
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"A penal statute which is imposed for the protection of particular individ-
uals establishes a duty of care based on contemporary community values
and ethics. The law of torts can only be out of joint with community stan-
dards if it ignores the existence of such duties.' ,33 In the court's view, the
law of torts had been "out of joint" for a number of years. Many other
courts soon agreed. 34 The Whetzel court started from the proposition that
where legislation prescribes a standard of conduct for the purpose of pro-
tecting life, limb, or property from a certain type of risk, and harm to the
interest sought to be protected comes about through breach of the standard
from the risk sought to be obviated, then the statutory prescription of the
standard will at least be considered in determining civil rights and liabili-
ties. 35
This principle of general tort law was long established. 36 Remarkably,
during the previous half century this principle had seldom been consid-
ered in premises liability cases, much less applied or expressly rejected.
Under this principle the Whetzel court might have held that a statutory
violation constituted negligence per se. 37 The court, however, stopped
short of that result. It held instead that violation of a statutory duty to
repair is evidence of negligence. 38 Other courts were willing to go further
to hold expressly that violation of a municipal housing code was negli-
gence per se.39
tiffs possession, the plaster had been pronounced in sound condition by a contractor hired by the
defendant to inspect and repair. Housing regulations for the District of Columbia required the land-
lord to put the premises in a safe condition prior to rental, and required the tenant to refrain from
occupying the unsafe premises. The plaintiff, after four months of occupation, was injured when the
bedroom ceiling fell. The plaintiff brought an action for damages, but the trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the
case for a new trial, stating that the housing code was a police regulation which affected the land-
lord's tort responsibility. Id. at 950. A violation was not necessarily negligence per se, but was at
least evidence of negligence. Thus, if the plaintiff established a prima facie case showing a violation,
the court must send the case to the jury with instructions on statutory negligence and evidence of
negligence. Id.
33. Id. at 946.
34. See, e.g., Morgan v. Garris, 307 F.2d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1962); National Bank v. Dixon, 301
F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1961); McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961);
Saracino v. Capital Properties Assocs., 50 N.J. Super. 81, 141 A.2d 71 (1958); Frion v. Coren, 13
Wis. 2d 300, 108 N.W.2d 563 (1961).
35. Whetzel, 282 F.2d at 946 (quoting 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS 997 (1956)).
36. W. PROSSER. supra note 4, at § 36; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTs §§ 285-86 (1965); see
generally Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. REv. 453 (1932);
Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. Rev. 21 (1949); Wil-
liams, The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort, 23 MOD. L. REv. 233 (1960).
37. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 36, at 200.
38. Accord Soles v. Franzblau, 352 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 911 (1966);
Gula v. Gawel, 71 11. App. 2d 174, 218 N.E.2d 42 (1966); Montgomery v. Engel, 179 N.W.2d 478
(Iowa 1970); Dolan v. Suffolk Franklin Say. Bank, 355 Mass. 665,246 N.E.2d 798 (1969).
39. Crawford v. Palomar, 7 Mich. App. 21, 151 N.W.2d 236 (1967) (relying on Morningstar v.
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The essence of these decisions is that a landlord will be held to a stan-
dard of due care and that a violation of a municipal code at least indicates
that the standard has been breached. This move toward a fault-based anal-
ysis brought with it a significant amount of related tort law. It soon be-
came clear, for example, that landlords held to a negligence standard
could avail themselves of traditional negligence defenses, including con-
tributory negligence 40 and assumption of the risk. 4 1 Whetzel itself raised
the confusing possibility that a tenant could be contributorily negligent
simply by occupying premises he knows do not comply with housing reg-
ulations. 42 Courts have also applied the principles of proximate causa-
tion, requiring that the injury be a reasonably foreseeable result of the
landlord's statutory violation. 43 Courts have discussed the degree of
knowledge of the dangerous condition that must be attributable before
liability can be imposed, 44 and determined whether the landlord had a
duty to inspect to discover violations. 45
Following Whetzel, other federal courts similarly began to base tort lia-
bility on violations of housing codes and other protective legislation. 46 In
the meantime, state courts were steadily arriving at the same point of
view. New York and Michigan were, of course, already there. 47 Others
soon followed. 48
Strich, 326 Mich. 541, 40 N.W.2d 719 (1950)); see also Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 256
A.2d 246 (1969).
40. Ziskin v. Confietto, 137 Conn. 629, 79 A.2d 816 (1951) (tenant who knowingly used defec-
tive premises guilty of contributory negligence at law if danger is obvious); Prudhomme v. Berry, 69
So. 2d 620 (La. Ct. App. 1953) (tenant contributorily negligent as to injuries received when floor
caved in, since defect was apparent due to hole in floor and fact that floor shook when she walked on
it); see also Nelson v. Parkhurst, 304 So. 2d 72 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Awad v. McColgan, 357 Mich.
386, 98 N.W.2d 571 (1959).
41. Green v. Southern Furniture Co., 94 So. 2d 508 (La. Ct. App. 1957); Howe v. Gambuzza,
15 N.J. Super. 368, 83 A.2d 466 (1951); Settles v. Stobridge Lithographing Co., 101 Ohio App.
479, 136 N.E.2d 925 (1956).
42. Whetzel, 282 F.2d at 950.
43. Klein v. Price, 331 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (where wife during scuffle pushed husband
through railing of second-story porch, landlord is not liable, for he need not provide a "safe arena"
for such altercations); Blue Grass Restaurant Co. v. Franklin, 424 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1968) (court
found lack of handrail on stairway was proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries from falling); Dolan v.
Suffolk Franklin Sav. Bank, 355 Mass. 665, 246 N.E.2d 798 (1969) (violation of ordinance requir-
ing automatic sprinkler systems does not in itself give rise to cause of action, but is only evidence of
negligence).
44. National Bank v. Dixon, 301 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Benjamin v. Kimble, 43 Misc. 2d
497, 251 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1964).
45. Dixon, 301 F.2d 507; McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961).
46. E.g., Soles v. Franzblau, 352 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 911 (1966).
47. See supra notes 22, 25-26, and accompanying text.
48. Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 256 A.2d 246 (1969); Dolan v. Suffolk Franklin Sav.
Bank, 355 Mass. 665, 246 N.E.2d 798 (1969); Saracino v. Capital Properties Assocs., 50 N.J. Su-
per. 81, 141 A.2d 71 (1958); Michaels v. Brookchester, 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958); Haar-
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The result generally was to move the issue of premises liabililty from
the rigid categories of the past to a more flexible consideration of reason-
ableness standards. 49 At the same time, courts were considering the inclu-
sion of traditional defenses to tort liability50 and incorporating other tort
principles as well. Liability to third parties, with accompanying consider-
ations of proximate cause, became an active issue.51 Some courts held
landlords liable for failing to provide adequate security measures, despite
the absence of statutory or express lease provisions compelling such an
obligation, and despite the fact that some of these occurrences took place
in private dwelling areas rather than in common areas. 52 Clearly, the
touchstone requirement of control was losing its force.
Like most movements, this one was neither unanimous nor universal.
Some courts continued to hold to the traditional view. 53 But the momen-
tum was strong in the other direction. More and more courts recognized
that tenants were within the class of persons intended to be protected by
housing quality legislation, 54 and that legislatures must have intended for
tenants to have causes of action in case of breach to assure effective en-
forcement of those standards. 55
B. The Introduction and Implications of the Warranty of Habitability
Into this world of changing assumptions came the collateral idea that
the landlord "warrants" that leased premises are, and will be, suitable for
inhabitation. To some extent this development flowed naturally from two
other trends. The first was the law of sales contracts for personal prop-
erty. In 1906 the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws adopted the Uni-
meyer v. Roth, 113 Ohio. App. 74, 177 N.E.2d 507 (1960); Frion v. Coren, 13 Wis. 2d 300, 108
N.W.2d 563 (1961).
49. McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961); Dolan v. Suffolk Frank-
lin Say. Bank, 355 Mass. 665, 246 N.E.2d 798 (1969); Morningstar v. Strich, 326 Mich. 541, 40
N.W.2d 719 (1950); Daniels v. Brunton, 9 N.J. Super. 294,76 A.2d 73 (1950).
50. See supra notes 40-41.
51. E.g., Crawford v. Palomar, 7 Mich. App. 21, 151 N.W.2d 236 (1967); see Pinsky, Real
Property, 15 RuTGERS L. REv. 276, 278 (1961).
52. Bass v. City of New York, 61 Misc. 2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 38 A.D.2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569, affd, 32 N.Y.2d 894, 300 N.E.2d 154, 346 N.Y.S.2d
814 (1973); Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see infra
notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
53. Where a tenant died as a result of fumes from an unvented gas stove in the housekeeping
room of a boarding house, one court stated that a statute requiring that "[a]ll public buildings which
may be used as a place of ... occupancy ... and all other buildings or parts and appurtenances
thereof... shall be so constructed, erected, equipped, and maintained that they shall be safe and
sanitary for their intended use and occupancy," was too vague to alter the common-law duties im-
posed upon a landlord. Branham v. Fordyce, 103 Ohio App. 379, 145 N.E.2d 471,475 (1957).
54. E.g., McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal Rptr. 260,263 (1961).
55. Id.
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form Sales Act, which stated that sales of "goods" by a "seller" in-
cluded an implied warranty of merchantability if the purchase had been
made by description. 56 The Commissioners' comment noted that this
standard was chosen in lieu of a less stringent one covering only "latent"
defects about which the seller had been negligent, 57 a harbinger of some
problems that currently infect warranty questions in the landlord-tenant
field. 58 The Uniform Sales Act was replaced in the 1950's and 1960's by
the Uniform Commercial Code, which required that a warranty of mer-
chantability be implied in every sale of goods by a merchant. 59 The offi-
cial comment to the warranty section makes clear that this provision was
intended to broaden the scope of coverage provided by the Uniform Sales
Act6 0 -a result that has, in fact, taken place. 61
The second force leading to the notion that contracts to lease dwelling
units contain an implied warranty of habitability was a change in judicial
attitudes toward the nature of such leases. The principle that landlords
offered no implied guarantees regarding the condition or fitness of their
leaseholds was a pillar of the common law of property. 62 One strength of
this doctrine came from its consistency with the common-law view of the
leasehold as an estate in land. 63 Just as sellers of other interests in real
property did not-and do not-warrant anything not included in the four
corners of the transferring document, 64 neither did the lessor. A lease in-
terest was considered in the same manner as any other estate, and any
protections the buyer-lessee wanted had to be explicitly set out in the con-
tract. 65 Nothing would be implied.
During the nineteenth century, however, a small loophole appeared.
This exception to the "no warranty" rule required landlords of furnished
dwellings, whether the lease was for "a few days, a few weeks, or
months," 66 to warrant that such premises were "in a proper condition for
immediate use as a dwelling." 67 The reasons given for the exception
were that lessees of such property did not have the customary opportunity
56. UNIF. SALES ACT § 15(2) (1906).
57. Id. § 15 commissioners' comment.
58. See infra Parts IV & V.
59. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1976).
60. Id. § 2-314 official comment.
61. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9.6-.8 (2d ed.
1980).
62. 1 ALP, supra note 1, § 3.78, at 346.
63. Id. §§3.11-.12, at202-05.
64. 3 id. §§ 12.124-.126, at 454-60.
65. 1 id. §§ 3.11-.12, at 202-07.
66. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892); Smith v. Marrable, 11 M. & W. 5,
152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843).
67. Ingalls, 31 N.E. at 287.
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to inspect, and that these lessees deserved unusual protection because
they were more interested in the dwelling itself than the land beneath. 68
Eventually, similar considerations were invoked to justify implication of
such a warranty in sales of new homes. 69 For decades commentators
noted the similarity between housing subject to this short-term lease ex-
ception and many other kinds of dwelling units. 70 But not until over
seventy years later, when a New York family rented what proved to be a
rat-infested luxury home on Diamond Head, did a court recognize the
applicability of the exception to anything but "temporary" housing. 71
Then the floodgates opened. Within five years a host of appellate courts
had decided that the trends cited above led inexorably to the conclusions
that housing leases should be treated as contracts rather than estates, and
that a warranty of habitability should be implied into each of those con-
tracts. 72 Reference was often made to local housing codes in order to
provide the substantive content of the warranty. 73 Within another five
years, over half the country's legislatures had joined the surge. 74 The
warranty of habitability had become an accomplished fact.
Yet in the final rush to adjudicate, then legislate, an implied warranty
of habitability in leases, the public bodies .collectively ignored both the
past and the future. The prime foundation for implying a warranty in both
real and personal property transactions had been the buyer's lack of op-
portunity to examine effectively before lease or sale. The focus was per-
sonal, limited in time, and limited solely to protection from undiscover-
able defects. But when the new warranty of habitability began to be
widely adopted a rationale of a more global and impersonal nature was
established-the need to preserve a dwindling stock of low-cost urban
housing.75 This deviation led directly to a larger, more substantive one.
68. Id.
69. See cases collected in Roeser, The Implied Warranty of Habitability in the Sale of New Hous-
ing: The Trend in Illinois, 1978 S. ILL. L.J. 178.
70. E.g., Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1279 (1960).
71. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426,462 P.2d 470 (1964); see also Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 646
(1971).
72. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 915
(1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Jack
Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa
1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway,
363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87,276 A.2d 248 (1971); Berzito
v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wn. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160
(1973)..
73. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1072-73; Mease, 200 N.W.2d at 796.
74. R. SCHOSHNSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD-TENANr §§ 3.30-.45 (1980).
75. The Javins court stated:
The inequality in bargaining power between landlord and tenant has been well documented.
Tenants have very little leverage to enforce demands for better housing. Various impediments to
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While a need to protect buyers from undiscoverable defects naturally
wanes as the product is used over time, the need to preserve urban hous-
ing never lessens. The warranty was thus quickly extended throughout the
tenancy in the form of a duty to maintain and repair, regardless of the
duration of the lease. Thus another bastion of the common law fell; never
before had tenants been afforded an implied right to have their landlords
repair the leased premises.
Thus, within a very short period of time the courts undercut all of the
basic premises upon which the allocation of traditional tort responsibility
between the landlord and the tenant had rested, and simultaneously
shifted the central emphasis of landlord-tenant relations from property to
contract. Moreover, the courts chose the term "warranty" to describe the
duty to the tenant, without recognizing that this term carried with it a
considerable history and a well-defined meaning in its modem, personal
property context. These fundamental changes created the possibility of
modifications in matters traditionally the sole province of tort law, such
as the source and scope of responsibility for damage or injury, the ability
to waive that responsibility, remedies, and most basically, the relation-
ship of responsibility to fault. Yet few of the courts adopting the implied
warranty of habitability recognized this radical change in the traditional
doctrine, and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws did so only indi-
rectly in the Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (URLTA). 76 Con-
fusion was invited, and it came, with some jurisdictions sticking fast to
tort law, some turning to contract-based warranty law, some using a bit of
each separately or in tandem.
IV. PREMISES LIABILITY LAW SINCE 1970: TORT
The jurisdictions that use tort law as the vehicle for determining prem-
ises liability issues have broken into two general camps. Some retain the
traditional rule of nonliability and its related control doctrine. The others
employ a more flexible approach based on a general negligence test of
reasonableness under the total circumstances.
competition in the rental housing market, such as racial and class discrimination and standard-
ized form leases, mean that landlords place tenants in a take it or leave it situation. The increas-
ingly severe shortage of adequate housing further increases the landlord's bargaining power and
escalates the need for maintaining and improving the existing stock.
428 F.2d at 1079 (footnotes omitted). See also Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 6, 15, 36-37 (1967); RE-
PORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (The Kerner Report) 468-69
(1968).
76. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT ACT (1972) [hereinafter cited as URLTA].
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An example of the former is Kansas. 77 In 1975 the Kansas Supreme
Court delineated the traditional exceptions to the landlord immunity rule
and found none applicable. 78 The court reached this conclusion without
consideration of whether a reasonable landlord would have done anything
to remedy an allegedly dangerous condition,or whether the landlord had
unreasonably created the damage by failing to finish certain repairs he had
begun. 79 In a later case, the court again rejected the opportunity to adopt a
negligence standard, relying once more on the control doctrine. 80
Kansas is not alone. Other courts have maintained their allegiance to
the immunity rule. 81 But the trend in those jurisdictions that continue to
use a tort-based analysis seems clearly toward a negligence standard, ei-
ther through interpretation of a specific statutory requirement or, as in
many cases, absent any legislative mandate.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court provided a leading example of
this trend toward a negligence standard in Sargent v. Ross.82 Though
clearly related to a warranty analysis, 83 Sargent is a prime example of the
more flexible tort-based analysis. The primary basis for the decision is the
court's recognition that the underpinnings of the traditional immunity
rules no longer exist under current urban conditions. The court found the
traditional exceptions not totally irrelevant, but applicable "only in-
asmuch as they bear on the basic tort issues such as the foreseeability and
unreasonableness of the particular risk of harm. "84 The court said that the
plaintiff no longer must fit his case into a specific exception. Instead, the
plaintiff must show that the landlord breached a general duty of care. The
inquiry would be shifted "from the traditional question of 'who had con-
trol?' to a determination of whether the landlord, and the injured party,
exercised due care under all the circumstances.' '85 Consistent with Sar-
gent, other courts were prompted to adopt a negligence standard by the
recent acceptance of the warranty of habitability. 86
The effect of legislation, presaged by the early cases in New York and
77. See Borders v. Roseberry, 216 Kan. 486, 532 P.2d 1366 (1975).
78. 532 P.2d at 1369-72.
79. Id.
80. Moore v. Muntzel, 231 Kan. 46, 642 P.2d 957 (1982).
81. Dunson v. Friedlander Realty, 369 So. 2d 792 (Ala. 1979) (landlord liable for voluntary
repairs made negligently, for concealed defects known to him, and for failure to eliminate defects
after he agreed to do so); Wingard v. McDonald, 348 So. 2d 573 (Fla. App. 1977); Watson v.
McSoud, 566 P.2d 171 (Okla. App. 1977).
82. 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
83. See infra text accompanying notes 138-43.
84. Sargent, 308 A.2d at 534.
85. Id. at 535.
86. E.g., Pagelsdorfv. Safeco Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 2d 734, 284 N.W.2d 55 (1979).
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Michigan in the first half of the century, 87 and the growing strength of the
general negligence doctrine, were recently demonstrated in Ohio. In 1980
the Ohio Supreme Court refused to impose tort liability on a landlord
even though he had failed to comply with a statute requiring maintenance
of the premises. 88 The court stated that there was "no express statutory
establishment of a cause of action in tort,"89 a position reminiscent of
Johnson v. Carter90 and Chambers v. Lowe. 91
Within only sixteen months, the Ohio court reversed its position. In
Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 92 plaintiff tenant was injured when an
outside stairway leading to her apartment collapsed. At trial the court
found that the stairway was under the tenant's exclusive control and was
not a common area. Under the traditional view the landlord would have
been immune. The supreme court nevertheless affirmed a judgment for
plaintiff, following the growing trend toward a flexible negligence ap-
proach. The court went even further than some of its predecessors, 93
holding that the violation of the statute was negligence per se. The court
was not bothered by the fact that the statutory listing of remedies did not
include a civil action for tort damages; in the court's view, this listing was
"cumulative" rather than exhaustive. 94
The control test was also losing force in jurisdictions where no legisla-
tion imposed an obligation on the landlord to maintain the premises. In
Brennan v. Cockrell Investments, the California Court of Appeals de-
parted from the traditional immunity rule without reference to any statute
other than a general law requiring all persons to use ordinary care in their
activities. 95 The landlord in Brennan urged a determination in his favor
based upon lack of possession or control. The court specifically rejected
the argument, stating that the degree of control should be only one factor
in deciding whether the landlord had acted reasonably under all the cir-
cumstances. 96 Other courts, also without any compulsion from a warranty
of habitability, have agreed. 97
In the decisions that adopt a general negligence test, certain issues are
more significant than they were under the former rule of landlord immu-
87. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
88. Thrash v. Hill, 63 Ohio St. 2d 178, 407 N.E.2d 495 (1980).
89. 407 N.E.2d at 498.
90. 218 Iowa 587, 255 N.W. 864 (1934).
91. ll7Conn. 624, 169A. 912(1933).
92. 68 Ohio St. 2d 20,427 N.E.2d 774 (1981).
93. See supra notes 21-26, 32-55, and accompanying text.
94. Shroades, 427 N.E.2d at 777.
95. 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973).
96. Id. at 800-01, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
97. E.g., Presson v. Mountain States Properties, Inc., 18 Ariz. App. 176, 501 P.2d 17 (1972);
Corrigan v. Janney, 626 P.2d 838 (Mont. 1981).
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nity. These include questions of contributory negligence, proximate
cause, and liability to third parties. Courts considered contributory negli-
gence even under the traditional landlord immunity rule; an injured plain-
tiff who managed to fit his case under one of the recognized exceptions
could still be barred from recovery if he had himself acted negligently. 98
But application of contributory negligence principles seems more appro-
priate and more doctrinally consistent when general negligence principles
are applied to the conduct of both landlord and tenant. This recognition
has no doubt sped the movement toward greater use of the doctrine.
All of the states adopting a general negligence test have followed the
New Hampshire lead in regarding the element of control not as disposi-
tive, but only as a factor in deciding the question of negligence. "Matters
of control," the Massachusetts court said, "can be components of famil-
iar negligence analysis [in that] they can affect such questions as reason-
ableness and foreseeability. "99 That court also introduced the element of
notice into the analysis, stating that "a landlord should not be liable in
negligence unless he knew or reasonably should have known of the defect
and had a reasonable opportunity to repair it."100 Under this approach,
notice and control are relevant "only insofar as they bear on the ultimate
question: Did the landlord exercise ordinary care in the maintenance of
the premises under all the circumstances?" 101
Foreseeability is generally an important element in the assessment of
damages. General tort principles allow plaintiffs who establish liability,
whether they be tenants or third parties, to collect for personal injuries,
damage to personal property, and loss of income due to injury, so long as
this harm was foreseeable. 10 2 But under a general negligence system,
foreseeability also plays an active role in the initial determination of lia-
bility. Once foreseeability becomes a general component of premises lia-
bility analysis, an accompanying danger or opportunity, depending on
perspective, exists to expand tenant causes of action. Two areas of recent
concern exemplify this potential for expansion: the liability of landlords
98. E.g., Houchin v. Willow Ave. Realty Co., 453 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. 1970); Branham v. For-
dyce, 103 Ohio App. 359, 145 N.E.2d 471 (1957).
99. Young v. Garwacki, 380 Mass. 162,402 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (1980).
100. Id.
101. Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 2d 734, 284 N.W.2d 55,61 (1979).
102. See Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173 (D.C. 1977); Knapp v. Wilson, 535 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1976). In Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App. 1976), the court
held it appropriate for a jury to consider aggravation of the tenant's alcoholism as a compensable
injury.
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for mental suffering that results from defective premises, 103 and the duty
of landlords to provide security from criminal activity. 104
Several cases have held landlords liable for mental suffering derived
from wrongful eviction, 105 but a more difficult question arises when ten-
ants claim mental suffering because they must continue to live in uninha-
bitable premises. In a recent Massachusetts case a tenant was allowed to
recover on a counterclaim for reckless infliction of emotional distress that
resulted when her apartment was repeatedly flooded by sewage water. 106
The Massachusetts high court was satisfied that the conduct of the land-
lord was "outrageous" and that the resulting emotional distress was "se-
vere." 107 An important factor in the court's decision was that defendant
"knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result
of his conduct." 108
Expansion of landlord liability has also occurred in the area of respon-
sibility for criminal activity. The general position of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts has been that the landlord is not required to make spe-
cial provisions for security in the absense of a special relationship, 109 and
several decisions have so held. I10 The rationale of these decisions is that
the economic consequences of requiring security measures would ulti-
mately and unfairly fall on the tenant,'1 11 and also that the action of the
person committing the crime constitutes an intervening and superseding
cause of the damage. 112 That the prevention of crime is generally consid-
103. Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New Issues, 62
CALIF. L. REV. 1444, 1470-73 (1974).
104. Smith, The Landlord's Duty to Defend His Tenants Against Crime on the Premises, 4 WHrr.
TIER L. REV. 587 (1982); Haines, Landlords or Tenants: Who Bears the Cost of Crime?, 2 CARDOZO
L. REV. 299 (1981).
105. Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal. App. 2d 124, 217 P.2d 113 (1950); Johnson v. Howard,
92 Ga. App. 96, 88 S.E.2d 217 (1955); Beasley v. Freedman, 256 Pa. Super. 208, 389 A.2d 1087
(1978); Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or. 435, 600 P.2d 398 (1979); see also Annot., 6 A.L.R.4th 528
(1981); Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 936 (1951).
106. Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982); see also Fair v. Negley, 257 Pa.
Super. 50, 390 A.2d 240 (1978).
107. Simon, 431 N.E.2dat562.
108. Id. at 561 (citing Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976)).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 314A, 315, 320 (1965).
110. Totten v. More Oakland Residential Hous., Inc., 63 Cal. App. 3d 538, 134 Cal. Rptr. 29
(1976); Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
111. Goldberg, 186 A.2d at 297-98.
112. Id. at 297; Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (court states, however, that landlord has duty to take steps to prevent crime in areas under his
control if he has received notice); DeFoe v. W. & J. Sloane, 99 A.2d 639 (D.C. 1953); Johnston v.
Harris, 30 Mich. App. 627, 186 N.W.2d 752 (1971), rev'd, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972)




ered a governmental task has also worked favorably for landlords, as has
the severe difficulty of defining the precise limitations of the duty. 113
But other cases have held for injured tenants, using the standards of
foreseeability and general negligence. These courts find that reasonably
prudent landlords will provide a secure entrance system, adequate light-
ing, and proper locks. 114 These criminal activity cases seem to be treated
specially by the courts, unrelated to and perhaps inconsistent with their
general treatment of landlord tort liability.
Notice is an important factor in the criminal activity cases. It usually
takes the form of a requirement that the landlord have reasonable notice
of deficient security and recent occurrence of criminal activity. Even
among cases holding for tenants there is a spectrum of views on the notice
question. One court has required that a defendant landlord have notice of
criminal activity on the leased premises themselves. 115 Other courts have
found sufficient notice when criminal activity has occurred in the land-
lord's apartment complex or in the general locale. 116
While the criminal activity cases are generally decided by applying
foreseeability and negligence doctrines, elements of control occasionally
creep back into the analysis. Some courts have declined to hold a landlord
liable for criminal occurrences in large apartment complexes. 117 Al-
though not expresssly stated, the rationale seems to be that courts believe
it unreasonable to expect a landlord to have control over a large building
or complex. In a New York case, however, liability was imposed when
113. A California court rhetorically asked:
"Does an apartment owner have a duty to install and maintain lighting for security purposes?"
If such a duty could be said to exist, the questions that would logically follow are of what candle
power? and in what areas? To ask these questions is to demonstrate the futility of attempting to
impose and define such a duty.
The 7735 Hollywood Boulevard Venture v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 901, 905, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 528,530 (1981).
114. Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 503 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Kan. 1980); Trentacost
v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980); Bass v. City of New York, 61 Misc. 2d 465, 305
N.Y.S.2d 801 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 38 A.D.2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1972), affd, 32
N.Y.2d 894,300 N.E.2d 154, 346 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1973).
115. Stribling v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 34 11. App. 3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47 (1975); see also
Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1978).
116. In some of the cases holding the landlord liable, the tenant himself had previously notified
the landlord of the security deficiency. Stribling v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 34 111. App. 3d 551, 340
N.E.2d 47 (1975); Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173 (D.C. 1977).
There is no sound reason, however, to require that notice come from the tenant or from any other
person. It should be sufficient that a reasonable landlord under the circumstances would have become
aware of the situation by the exercise of ordinary diligence, and some cases have so stated. Kline v.
1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich.
569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972); Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980).
117. Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962); Knapp v. Wilson, 535
S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
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the landlord employed only one policeman to control a sixteen-acre, ten-
building complex. 118 The entirely sensible conclusion was that the mea-
sures necessary to discharge the duty of reasonable care actually in-
creased with the extensiveness of the premises. Thus the reasonably pru-
dent landlord would provide more, not less, security as he expands the
perimeter of his activity.
V. PREMISES LIABILITY LAW SINCE 1970: WARRANTY
While some courts were struggling with the application of traditional
common-law tort principles to premises liability questions in light of
changing regulatory and social conditions, others began to ponder the im-
plications of the adoption of a warranty of habitability. This division did
not prove to be a clean one. Not only did a few states refuse to adopt the
warranty,' 19 but occasionally courts in states with a statutory warranty
failed to notice the possible relationship between the new warranty and
premises liability. In Minnesota, for example, the supreme court handled
a typical tenant injury case solely by reference to common-law tort princi-
ples, assigning liability to the party who "controlled" the area in which
the injury occurred. 120 It did so without any recognition of a Minnesota
habitability statute passed three years before the injury and six years be-
fore the decision. That statute required all residential landlords to keep
both rented premises and common areas "fit," and to maintain both to
levels set by local housing and safety codes. 121
A related but more curious example occurred in Kansas. The Kansas
Supreme Court decreed a warranty judicially in 1974122 and the legisla-
ture enacted its version of the URLTA in 1975.123 Nevertheless, during
that same period, the supreme court decided two premises liability cases
without a flicker of recognition that the outcome might be affected by
either the judicial or statutory warranty. 124 The court also failed to con-
118. Bass v. City of New York, 61 Misc. 2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1969). rev'd on other
grounds, 38 A.D.2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1972), affd. 32 N.Y.2d 894, 300 N.E.2d 154, 346
N.Y.S.2d 814 (1973).
119. Cohran v. Boothby Realty Co., 379 So. 2d 561, 564 (Ala. 1980); Blackwell v. Del Bosco,
191 Colo. 334, 558 P.2d 563, 565 (1976).
120. Lillemoen v. Gregorich, 256 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. 1977) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 360 (1965) to substantiate both its characterization and resolution of the issue).
121. MINN. STAT ANN § 504.18(l) (West Supp. 1982). These duties are not transferable to the
tenant without an agreement "supported by adequate consideration and set forth in conspicuous writ-
ing." Id. § 504.18(2).
122. Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974).
123. 1975 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 290 (codified at KAN. STAT ANN §§ 58-2540 to 58-2573 (1976).
124. Borders v. Roseberry, 216 Kan. 486, 532 P.2d 1366 (1975); Albanese v. Edwardsville
Mobile Home Village, Inc., 215 Kan. 826, 529 P.2d 163 (1974).
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sider the effect of the warranty in a decision involving incidents arising
before the warranty had been judicially announced. 125 In that same year,
however, the intermediate court of appeals did use the Kansas URLTA to
resolve a similar premises liability question. 126
Most appellate courts in states with warranties of habitability have at
least recognized some of the issues concerning residential premises lia-
bilty raised by adoption of the warranty. But treatment of those issues has
varied widely. To some extent the reactions simply reflect the particular
facts before the court. More often, though, they mirror very different atti-
tudes about the scope and purpose of a warranty of habitability, the gen-
eral relationship of fault principles to premises liability, and applicability
of underlying warranty assumptions to damage and injury cases.
A. Status Quo
Courts in two states have considered the effect of an adopted warranty
of habitability on residential premises liability issues and concluded that
there is none. The Illinois appellate courts have reached this position most
systematically.
The Illinois Supreme Court judically established a warranty of habita-
bility in 1972 without indication of possible impact on broader tort is-
sues. 127 This second question arose four years later before the court of
appeals. Plaintiff-tenant was injured when he fell down steps at his sin-
gle-family home, and sued defendant-landlord for damages, alleging
breach of warranty of habitability. 128 The court imposed no liability. It
based its decision on traditional landlord-tenant tort doctrine, stating that
tenants "control" the entire premises in single-family residences. More
importantly, the court specifically rejected any notion that the "warranty
of habitability ... [was] intended to change the established law in Illinois
governing personal injury suits by tenants against landlords."' 129 While
noting that some had predicted strict liability for landlords "as one of the
normal costs of doing business,"' 130 the court found no analogy to the
product liability field. It pointed out that the landlord was already liable in
tort for injuries or damages arising from the traditional exceptions, and
125. Lemley v. Penner, 230 Kan. 25,630 P.2d 1086 (1981).
126. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Hewins, 6 Kan. App. 2d 259, 627 P.2d 1159 (1981).
127. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 I11. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972) (tenant used breach of
implied warranty of habitability as defense to forcible entry and detainer action).
128. Dapkunas v. Cagle, 42 I1l. App. 3d 644, 356 N.E.2d 575 (1976).
129. 356 N.E.2d at 579.
130. Id. (quoting 64 A.L.R.3d 339, 344 (1975)).
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that administrative enforcement of modem building codes provided a sec-
ond important protection for tenants and third parties. 131
Texas is apparently the only other state aligned with Illinois in this con-
servative view. The Texas Supreme Court judicially declared a warranty
of habitability for residential leases in 1978 in the case of Kamarath v.
Bennett. 132 However, cases decided both before and after Kamarath held
that the warranty of habitability would not apply to personal injury tort
actions. 133 In response to Kamarath the Texas legislature enacted article
5236f of the Texas code in 1979.134 Article 5236f both creates a land-
lord's duty to repair 35 and abrogates the Kamarath implied warranty.1 36
Thus, the new statute effectively eliminates the operation of premises lia-
bility under the warranty of habitability in Texas. 137
B. The Fault-Affected-by-the-Warranty View
A second group of courts specifically reaffirms that traditional tort rules
should govern premises liability questions. But these courts also hold that
the adoption of a warranty of habitability should move the examination
away from the traditional immunity doctrine toward an analysis based on
131. Dapkunas, 356 N.E.2d at 581. The Illinois courts have held fast to this original determina-
tion. A second Illinois Court of Appeals decision concerned a fall in a multiunit building. After
holding that there was no warranty because the community had no housing code at the time of the
incident, the court reaffirmed its earlier statement regarding tort liability. Beese v. National Bank, 82
I1l. App. 3d 932, 403 N.E. 2d 595 (1980). An Illinois Supreme Court decision a year later cast
momentary doubt on the lower court's position by reinstating a tenant's counterclaim for personal
injury while reversing a decision that the warranty of habitability did not apply to single-family resi-
dences. The decision seemed to recognize implicitly that a damage action would lie for breach of
warranty. Pole Realty Co. v. Sorrells, 84 I11. 2d 178, 417 N.E.2d 1297 (1981). But a year later the
Illinois Court of Appeals again slammed the door, specifically reiterating that breach of warranty
does not give rise to a cause of action for injury or property damage. Auburn v. Amoco Oil Co., 106
I11. App. 3d 60, 435 N.E.2d 780 (1982). All of these decisions apparently construed only the judi-
cially created warranty, giving no recognition to an arguably applicable Illinois statute. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 80, § 91 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (declaring exculpatory clauses in residential leases to be
void as against public policy).
132. 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978).
133. Porter v. Lumberman's Inv. Corp., 606 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Morris v.
Vaylor Eng'g Co., 565 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (decided before Kamarath).
134. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1978, ch. 780 (codified at TEX. REV. CIv STAT, ANN. art. 5236f
(Vernon Supp. 1982)).
135. Id. art. 5236f, § 2.
136. Id. § 14: "The duties of the landlord and the remedies of the tenant as set forth in this Act
shall apply in lieu of existing common law and statutory law regarding the landlord's warranty or
duties of maintenance, repair, security, habitability, and nonretaliation, and the tenant's remedies for
violations thereof."
137. See McSwain & Butler, The Landlord's Statutory Duty to Repair-Article 5236f. The Leg-
islative Response to Kamarath v. Bennett, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 6 (1978) ("Essentially, the Act
substitutes the statutory formula for the Kamarath implied warranty of habitability.").
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whether due care was exercised in light of all circumstances. The New
Hampshire approach is the prime example of this view.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court judicially adopted a warranty of
habitability in 1971 in Kline v. Burns.138 Two years later, the same court
heard a case involving the death of a young child caused by a fall down an
outdoor stairway at her parents' apartment building. 139 Evidence at trial
tended to prove that the defendant-landlord had not retained control over
the stairway. Plaintiff's evidence failed to prove that the stairway was
"common." In addition, the court simply refused to accept the argument
that the steepness of the stairs (the apparent cause of the accident) was a
hidden defect or secret danger, and refused to extend the negligent repairs
doctrine to cover negligent construction or design. Thus, had the court
applied the traditional immunity doctrine, plaintiff would have lost.
But the court did not apply the traditional doctrine. Instead of follow-
ing the plaintiffs suggestion to enlarge an exception to the landlord's
immunity, the court found it "more realistic instead to consider reversing
the general rule of nonliability."1 40 As noted previously, the court based
its decision in part on the difficulties created for juries by the exceptions,
and in significant part on the general trend away from special immunities.
But it also found that the "conclusion springs naturally and inexorably
from our recent decision in Kline v. Burns." 141 By implying a warranty
of habitability in Kline, the court stated, it had stricken caveat lessee from
the law of the state, and had thereby "discarded the very legal foundation
and justification for the landlord's immunity in tort for injuries to the ten-
ant or third persons." 142 The court did not, however, go further to find
any effect from the warranty itself on the nature of the landlord's liability.
It stated a rule based securely in negligence: "A landlord must act as a
reasonable person under all of the circumstances including the likelihood
of injury to others, the probable seriousness, of such injuries, and the bur-
den of reducing or avoiding the risk." 143
New Jersey and Florida have followed the New Hampshire lead,
though in different ways. New Jersey was a forerunner in establishing the
warranty of habitability, as well as in examining how it affected the con-
tractual relations between the parties. 144 The state's intermediate appel-
138. 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
139. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).




144. Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown,
111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970);
Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969). Reste was, arguably, the first
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late court had the first opportunity to measure the impact of the warranty
on tort responsibility. It embraced the conservative Illinois position:
The development of this new "bill of rights" for tenants, however, does
not necessarily lead to the imposition of liability in tort on a landlord bot-
tomed upon a concept of a continuing warranty of habitability. We are of
the opinion that [establishment of the warranty] was not intended to over-
turn existing principles of law applicable to tort actions for personal injuries
145
The case was affirmed without opinion by the New Jersey Supreme
Court. 14 6
But in a subsequent case the same supreme court moved toward the
New Hampshire view. 147 While acknowledging the previous opinion in a
footnote, 14 8 the court mused in obvious dicta that while the "duty" (of
security) should be based on "familiar negligence concepts," the duty
should also "be founded upon a frank recognition that the landlord is in a
superior position to take the necessary precautions . . . or [that] the con-
cept of an implied warranty of habitability . . . is flexible enough to en-
compass appropriate security devices." 149
Florida arrived at a similar position by another route. It enacted its ver-
sion of the URLTA in 1973.150 The courts deciding the first premises lia-
bility cases after passage of the statute seemed to overlook a possible con-
nection between the statutory duties imposed on the landlord and
premises liability. 151 But they now recognize the connection, and this rec-
ognition has led to the conclusion that breach of the statutory duties is
"evidence of negligence." 152
A recent Florida Supreme Court case set out specific standards for
landlord conduct, basing those standards on "reasonableness" and noting
that the standards parallel those set by the Florida version of the
warranty of habitability case. While Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W. 2d 409 (1961), is
usually cited as the premier case, some argue that it was subsequently overruled. See, e.g., Cunning-
ham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Con-
tract to Status, 16 URB L. ANN 3 (1979).
145. Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463, 466, aff d, 63 N.J.
577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973); see also Note, Landlord's Implied Warranty of Habitability Does Not Give
Rise to Strict Tort Liability for Tenant's Personal Injuries-Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 5
SETON HALL L. REV 409 (1974).
146. 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973).
147. Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975).
148. 346 A.2d at 87 n.16.
149. Id. at 86-87.
150. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-330 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.40-.66 (West Supp. 1982)).
151. E.g., Wingard v. McDonald, 348 So. 2d 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
152. Bennett v. Mattison, 382 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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URLTA.153 The decision is also significant because it allows suit by an
injured third party, and because it does not mention a notice requirement
as a condition precedent to the landlord's liability. Recently, the court of
appeals confirmed the negligence basis for liability and extended the right
to sue to a third-party plaintiff not in traditional privity with the land-
lord. 154
C. The Pennsylvania View
Midway along the spectrum of reactions to the effect of the warranty of
habitability on premises liability rests the idiosyncratic view of Pennsyl-
vania. It is midway because it contains portions of views ranging from
fault to no-fault, tort to contract. It is idiosyncratic for the same reason.
The Pennsylvania position is the first view discussed here that recognizes
warranty as essentially a contract notion, although it fails to apply that
idea to any area beyond remedies.
Pennsylvania was late in accepting the warranty of habitability, adopt-
ing it by intermediate appellate court decision in 1978,155 and by state
supreme court decision in 1979.156 Shortly after its decision, the appellate
court decided a pair of cases in which tenants sought damages from land-
lords for breach of warranty of habitability. 157 In the lead case, the court
held that "the warranty ... may be used as the basis for a complaint."1 58
The court restricted the damages allowed, however, to normal loss-of-
bargain recovery plus foreseeable economic losses.
The court enhanced the contract flavor of this decision by establishing a
strict notice requirement and, particularly, by discussing extensively
whether the warranty of habitability could be waived. A clause in the
lease agreement stated that the premises were taken "as is" and listed
deficiencies of which the tenant acknowledged awareness, one of which
was the ultimate source of the lawsuit. The trial court had analogized the
warranty of habitability to section 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 159 and based on that analogy concluded that the warranty could be
153. Mansurv. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1981).
154. Thompson v. Rock Springs Mobile Home Park, 413 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982). The dissent in this case argues that the URLTA is clearly meant to affect only the contractual
relations between landlord and tenant; thus, its breach cannot form the basis of a cause of action in
tort.
155. Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978), affid, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d
897 (1979).
156. Pu gh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272,405 A.2d 897 (1979).
157. Fair v. Negley, 257 Pa. Super. 50, 390 A.2d 240 (1978); Beasley v. Freedman, 256 Pa.
Super. 208, 389 A.2d 1087 (1978).
158. Fair, 390 A.2d at 242.
159. Id. at 243.
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waived. But the appellate court found the policy underlying adoption of
the warranty so significant that waiver should be disallowed. Addition-
ally, in both cases the court reversed grants of directed verdicts for defen-
dants on counts of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from
breach of warranty, raising the possibility that breach of warranty might
be used as the basis for an intentional tort. 160
The third and final Pennsylvania decision, also from the intermediate
appellate court, seems to mix even further the concepts of warranty, con-
tract, fault, and notice. In that case, the injured tenants sued for damages,
alleging negligence and breach of implied and express warranties. Di-
rected verdicts were given to the defendant-landlord on all counts. In re-
versing, the appellate court held that a breach of warranty of habitability
occurred whenever the tenant gave the landlord "notice" of a "danger-
ous" condition that the landlord did not take "reasonable care to repair,"
and added that the breach rendered the landlord liable for "physical harm
caused to the plaintiff." 16 1 The court also raised as a question of fact
whether or not the dangerous condition existed prior to the time when
plaintiff took possession, without indicating how it found this relevant to
its view. 162 This curious admixture of traditional tort dogma, the strict
liability notion of dangerousness, the contractual requirement of notice,
and the general overlay of reasonable conduct indicates the collage of
factors that insightful courts have addressed.
D. Breach of Warranty as Basisfor Tort-Like Action
Not far on the scale from Pennsylvania are those states which have
more clearly enunciated that a breach of warranty of habitability will give
rise to a cause of action for damage or injury, but which continue to base
liability on fault. Massachusetts is the best example of this approach.
Relying in part on limited statutory authority, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court declared a warranty of habitability as part of the
common law in 1973,163 specifically eschewing comment on "any ques-
160. Id. at 246; Beasley, 389 A.2d at 1088-89.
161. Rivera v. Selfon Home Repairs & Improvements Co., 294 Pa. Super. 41, 439 A.2d 739,
742-43 (1982).
162. The court based its decision in significant part on comments a, b, and c to REsTATENIENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.6 (1976). But while much of the opinion deals with that section, the
section seems to negate any distinction between conditions arising before and after the tenant takes
possession.
163. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973). The court
found assistance in reaching its conclusion in a 1965 rent withholding statute (now MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 239, § 8A (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983)), apparently overlooking a later statute specifically
dealing with premises liability.
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tion of tort liability."1 64 Six years later the court confronted that question.
In Crowell v. McCaffrey, 165 a tenant sued his landlord for injuries suf-
fered when a porch railing gave way during a New Year's Eve party. He
alleged both negligence and breach of warranty of habitability. The high
court reversed the trial judge's directed verdicts for defendant on both
counts. The court based the reversal on the negligence count exclusively
on a traditional "control" analysis. But the court also found a separate
cause of action for "tort damages" arising from breach of warranty, stat-
ing that "extension of the warranty to the ordinary residential tenancy...
carries with it liability for personal injuries caused by a breach."' 166 The
court acknowledged a Massachusetts statute requiring written notice from
tenants of any buildings of four units or more as a condition precedent to a
personal injury suit, 167 but found that "the building and sanitary codes"
required that a landlord exercise reasonable care to discover code viola-
tions, thereby avoiding the notice requirement while establishing a negli-
gence foundation for breach of warranty action. 168
Iowa and Missouri have also apparently adopted this stance, though
neither has stated the position as distinctly as Massachusetts. The lead
Iowa case held that a warranty against latent defects, without proof of the
landlord's knowledge, should be declared part of the common law be-
cause of the landlord's superior knowledge and bargaining position. 169
Violations of "applicable" housing codes were relevant evidence of
breach of the warranty. Remedies would be "the basic contract remedies
of damages, reformation, and rescission," and would include "[i]n all
events... the incidental and consequential damages which fall within the
general principles governing the allowance of such damages.'1 70 The
court continued the contract-based analysis by providing a specific notice
requirement and by reviewing the possibility of waiver. 171
This straightforward contract analysis broke down six years later. In
Duke v. Clark, 172 tenants sued their landlord for personal injuries arising
from a methane gas explosion. They based one count of the complaint on
breach of warranty of habitability. The court ultimately denied this count
164. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d at 843 n.13.
165. 377 Mass. 443,386 N.E.2d 1256 (1979).
166. 386 N.E.2d at 1261.
167. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 19 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983).
168. Crowell, 386 N.E.32d at 1261-62. A second Massachusetts case also reviewed the history of
landlord responsibility arising from implied warranty, and cited Crowell for the proposition that the
doctrine was available as the basis for a cause of action for personal injury. Negligence was again the
basis of liability. Young v. Garwacki, 380 Mass. 162, 402 N.E.2d 1045 (1980).
169. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972).
170. Id. at 796-97.
171. Id.at797-98.
172. 267 N.W.2d 63 (Iowa 1978).
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because the relevant provision of the housing code was not adopted until
after the commencement of plaintiffs' lease. But the court also found that
the landlord had properly abandoned on appeal his position that breach of
warranty could not be the basis for a tort claim. The court found it "well
settled [that] the neglect of a duty imposed by contract is a tort for which
an action ex delicto will lie."1 73 That small bombshell remains the last
Iowa pronouncement, and apparently allies that state with Massachusetts
as a jurisdiction that offers damages in tort for breach of warranty if fault
can be proved.
The single Missouri case concerned an attempt by tenants to collect for
both personal injuries and property damage from a fire which began in the
basement ceiling wiring of their multiunit building. 174 The tenants alleged
breach of warranty of habitability. The Missouri appellate court appar-
ently assumed that such a cause of action could lie, but held for defen-
dants because of lack of notice, even though the wiring was definitely in a
common area. The court struggled with the apparent unfairness of the
decision, but stated that to hold otherwise would subject the landlord to
strict liability. It concluded that a "notice requirement would seem to
reduce the concept of implied warranty of habitability to one of negli-
gence.' ' 75 This insightful comment, from a court so tangled in con-
ceptual difficulties that it reached a decision arguably more harsh than one
it might have reached under the traditional common law, provides an ap-
propriate bridge to consideration of the last group of jurisdictions. In
these cases, courts have confronted and struggled with at least some of
the many difficulties inherent in the relationship of strict tort liability,
contractual liability, and negligence.
E. Intimations of Strict Liability
Courts in only two states, New York and Indiana, have entertained the
possibility that adoption of a warranty of habitability entirely altered the
foundations of basic premises liability doctrine. Fundamentally, these
cases recognize that speaking of warranty has historically meant speaking
of contract, and that speaking of contract means moving away from liabil-
ity based on fault. Both states have clung to tort roots, at least to the
extent that they have become confused over whether the source of liabil-
ity without fault is tort or contract. But each has wrestled with the basic
questions raised by an implied warranty regarding traditional handling of
landlord-tenant premises liability issues.
173. Id. at 68.




The New York decisions come from lower appellate courts. They must
be reviewed in the context of New York's unique warranty statute, which
simply requires implication of a warranty of habitability in every residen-
tial lease, as opposed to the usual model, which sets standards of con-
duct. 176 The statute includes no notice requirement, prohibits waiver, and
provides for "damages." 177
Kaplan v. Courtson178 is the leading New York decision adopting a
strict liability standard for breach of warranty of habitability. 179 In Kap-
lan, tenants sued for injuries caused by a falling kitchen cupboard. Plain-
tiffs subsequently filed a motion to amend their complaint to add a cause
of action based on breach of warranty of habitability. The action was
based on a theory of strict liability, making the landlord liable without
proof of notice of defect. 180 After noting the developing connection be-
tween warranty law in leases and that in sales of personal property, the
court offered a detailed analysis of the policy arguments for and against
applying strict warranty liability in residential leases.
The court outlined the differences between residential leases and sales
of consumer goods that militate against the application of strict liability in
the lease setting: (1) leasing does not involve mass production of goods;
(2) landlords to be held responsible usually are not responsible for the
construction of the tenement; (3) most landlords have no expertise regard-
ing many potential defects; (4) defects have many possible causes in mul-
tiunit buildings; (5) landlords generally make no implied reservations re-
garding the safety of leaseholds; (6) tenants have no reasonable
expectation of the continued absence of hidden defects; and (7) landlords
generally have no notice. The court termed these arguments "quite com-
176. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1983) provides:
I. In every written or oral lease or rental agreement for residential premises the landlord or
lessor shall be deemed to covenant and warrant that the premises so leased or rented and all areas
used in connection therewith in common with other tenants or residents are fit for human habita-
tion and for the uses reasonably intended by the parties and that the occupants of such premises
shall not be subjected to any conditions which would be dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to
their life, health or safety. When any such condition has been caused by the misconduct of the
tenant or lessee or persons under his direction or control, it shall not constitute a breach of such
covenants and warranties.
2. Any agreement by a lessee or tenant of a dwelling waiving or modifying his rights as set
forth in this section shall be void as contrary to public policy.
3. In determining the amount of damages sustained by a tenant as a result of a breach of the
warranty set forth in the section, the court.., need not require any expert testimony ....
177. Id.
178. 85 Misc. 2d 745,381 N.Y.S.2d 634(1976).
179. The injuries complained of in Kaplan occurred in 1974, before the passage of the habitabil-
ity statute. Consequently, the court relied on the judicial declaration of a common-law warranty of
habitability found in Tonetti v. Perrati, 48 A.D.2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1975). See Kaplan, 381
N.Y.S.2d at 635.
180. 381 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
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pelling." Nevertheless, the court held that strict liability for breach of
warranty was a good cause of action, and allowed the plaintiffs to amend
their complaint. The court based its decision on persuasive arguments re-
garding the landlord's superior knowledge and ability to detect defects,
reliance, the ability of the landlord to spread the loss, and the difficulties
inherent in expecting plaintiffs to prove negligence. 181
In two other decisions with reasoning similar to the court's rationale in
Kaplan, New York courts have held that the New York habitability stat-
ute allows liability without fault, at least for economic damages. In Good-
man v. Ramirez, 182 the Civil Court of New York allowed consequential
economic damages for breach of warranty of habitability, analogizing to
the Uniform Commercial Code, and terming the breach a "wrongful
act." 183 In McBride v. 218 E. 70th Street Associates, 184 the appellate
court allowed liability under the habitability statute without consideration
of fault. Plaintiff sought property damage for flooding caused by the inad-
equacy of the New York City storm sewers. The court found the landlord
liable for breach of warranty of habitability upon the finding that damage
had occurred and that it was not caused by the tenant. 185
Were Kaplan, Goodman, and McBride its only decisions, New York
could be said definitely to impose liability without fault. But they are not.
The position of the New York Court of Appeals is unclear. In the only
court of appeals decision on warranty of habitability, rendered after Kap-
lan and before Goodman and McBride, the court held that the landlord
was liable for breach of the warranty of habitability without regard to
fault, but specifically refused to speculate whether available damages
would extend beyond loss of bargain. 186 A subsequent case in the appel-
late division makes a clear move away from strict liability.
In Curry v. New York City Housing Authority, 187 a tenant sued his
landlord for damages arising from his child's fall from a window ledge in
the apartment. While the action was based on three counts, the court
termed the count based on strict liability "the most important."1 88 The
court acknowleged that Kaplan and McBride had adopted the strict liabil-
ity position. The court went on to note, however, that courts in other ju-
risdictions had adopted a negligence-based approach, citing the lead New
181. Id. at 636-38.
182. 100 Misc. 2d 881,420 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1979).
183. 420 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
184. 102 Misc. 2d 279, 425 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1979).
185. 425 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
186. Park W. Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 418 N.Y.S.2d
310, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).




Jersey case. 189 In light of the conflict, and the court's perception of an
evolving negligence-based approach to landlord liability, the court con-
cluded that it was improbable that the New York legislature intended to
introduce a strict liability standard when it enacted the implied warranty
statute. 190 The court ultimately refused to decide whether strict liability
should apply, because it found the warranty of habitability inapplicable
on the facts. 191
The law in New York is thus unclear. The appellate division has spo-
ken twice, once for strict liability in McBride and once, in dicta, for a
fault-based system in Curry. All lower and intermediate courts await a
final court of appeals decision on the issue.
Indiana is the only other jurisdiction to consider directly the prospect of
strict liability. Indiana has no series of cases; it addressed the issue only in
the case of Old Town Development Co. v. Langford. 192 But that discus-
sion is the most insightful and significant to date.
The facts in Old Town are simple and tragic. Langford leased an apart-
ment in a new complex from Old Town. Three months later fire broke out
in the apartment, killing his wife and two children, severely injuring him,
and destroying all of the family's personal property. Langford filed an
action on three counts: (1) negligence, (2) breach of implied warranty of
habitability, and (3) strict tort liability for renting an apartment with a
defective heating system. The jury granted substantial monetary awards
on each count. In affirming the jury decision, the Indiana Court of Ap-
peals gave the most thoughtful analysis to date on the possible effects of a
warranty of habitability on premises liability law.
After a preliminary tracing of the warranty of habitability in Indiana,
the Indiana Court of Appeals announced that it was "readily apparent that
there is a basic inconsistency between adoption of a warranty of habitabil-
ity and retention of the ancient rule of tort immunity and its excep-
tion.' 1 93 Noting that in Indiana the remedy for breach of warranty of
habitability had been restricted to economic losses, the court stated that
this need not be the case. It pointed out that Indiana has always consid-
ered the usual contract remedies of "damages, rescission, specific perfor-
mance, reformation, and rent abatement" to include personal injuries that
were the natural and proximate result of a breach of contract. 194 The court
189. Id. at 306-07 (citing Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d
463 (1973)).
190. Curry, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
191. Id. at 308.
192. 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App. 1976), appeal dismissed, 267 Ind. 176, 369 N.E.2d 404
(1977).
193. 349 N.E.2d at 760.
194. Id. at 761.
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also cited the availability of such damages under section 2-715(2)(b) of
the Uniform Commercial Code. 195
The court then turned to "tort recovery," and the plot began to
thicken. It immediately asked the right question: "If [the landlord] is no
longer immune from tort liability ... is he strictly liable or liable only in
the event of his negligence?"' 196 After a review of both primary 197 and
secondary' 9 8 authorities, the court concluded that the tort standard must
be one of due care, in accord with New Hampshire's modified culpability
standard. The obvious difficulty was that the court did not decide whether
the landlord was responsible for breach of warranty without fault in con-
tract, or for negligence in tort, but that he was responsible for personal
injuries in either case. The court at least understood its own dilemma,
stating that "[p]ersonal injury and personal property recovery are thus
available regardless of which theory a tenant pursues. " 199
The question remained whether strict liability should be imposed for
leasing a tenement with a defective heater. The court specifically recog-
nized that a point of confluence existed between warranty liability arising
in contract and strict liability arising in tort, but found no cases in the
premises liability area that did not require fault. The court listed similar
policies underpinning adoption of a warranty of habitability on the one
hand and strict product liability on the other, then set out the differ-
ences. 200 The differences include, the court stated, the lack of "goods"
and a "seller" in the warranty situation, and none of the privity problems
that led to adoption of strict liability in the product field.2 01 Consequently,
although the court sensed that "the wind in Indiana blows in the direction
of strict liability in tort for a landlord leasing residential premises on a
195. Id.
196. Id. at 762.
197. "A landlord must act as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances including the
likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of reducing or
avoiding the risk." Id. at 762-63 (quoting Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528, 534
(1973)). The court went on to state:
[T]he nexus between duty and liability is proof of negligence. Negligence in this context re-
quires not only proof of the condition which causes the injury but that the condition was known
or should have been known by the landlord prior to the occurrence so that he had an opportunity
to correct it.
Old Town. 349 N.E.2d at 763 (quoting Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301
A.2d 463, 465 (1973)).
198. See Love, supra note 7; Note, The Fall of Landlord Tort Immuniti-Sargent v. Ross. 35
OHIO ST L.J. 212 (1974).
199. Old Town, 349 N.E.2d at 765.
200. Id. at 767 & n.28, 768.
201. Id. at 768.
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short term lease," 202 it deferred to the legislature or state supreme court
as the proper body to take such a step.
A final relevant aspect of the case was the court's analysis of the need
for notice. It stated that notice had generally been considered a precondi-
tion to an action (or defense) for breach of warranty of habitability. How-
ever, it also noted that a court could find hidden conditions present at the
beginning of a leasehold to be within the landlord's knowledge on a con-
structive notice theory. The court recognized that this idea "carries strong
overtones of strict liability,' '203 observing that such a conclusion is rea-
sonable by analogy to the Uniform Commercial Code. But it again de-
ferred to the legislature or higher court, although only to the extent of
requiring some notice, "either actual or constructive.' '204
So there the opinion dangles, caught somewhere between fault and no-
fault, notice and no-notice. The Indiana Supreme Court muddied matters
further by setting aside the decision in a very short and rather inscrutable
per curiam opinion. 205 The decision in Old Town is made even more un-
clear by the landlord's status as a builder-owner, although the appellate
court made little of that issue outside of its consideration of notice. Warts
and all, however, Old Town remains the fullest exposition of many of the
warranty and premises liability issues. It also is one of the finest examples
of the conceptual problems accompanying those issues.
VI. CLARITY AND CONFUSION IN CURRENT LAW-THE
COMMON ISSUES
To restate the current national law of premises liability is obviously
impossible. A few jurisdictions remain completely unaffected by the ac-
tivity of the past two decades, clinging steadfastly to common-law immu-
nity with its traditional exceptions. 206 Other courts have undertaken basic
alterations in tort law, moving away from traditional immunity to a negli-
gence standard based upon the circumstances of each case. 207 A growing
number have recognized an inherent connection between the adoption of
a warranty of habitability and premises liability questions. 208 Some of
these have concluded that breach of the warranty can affect tort liabil-
ity;20 9 others have used breach of warranty itself as the basis for a cause of
202. Id.
203. Id. at 775.
204. Id. at 776.
205. Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 267 Ind. 176, 369 N.E.2d 404 (1977).
206. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 81-118 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 138-54 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 138-54 and accompanying text.
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action. 210 A final group has understood the potentially vast ramifications
of use of the warranty in premises liability questions, and has openly dis-
cussed-and occasionally employed-a strict liability standard.21
The degree to which any jurisdiction has changed its premises liability
rules has not necessarily been related to the adoption of a warranty of
habitability. Several courts have decided that the traditional source of law
for such questions is unaffected by adoption of such a warranty.212 More
confusion is added by a hybrid view under which contract, warranty, and
negligence notions all play a role, allowing for the possibility of liability
for personal injury while limiting recovery to loss of bargain and impos-
ing strict notice requirements. 213
Yet, with the possible exception of those few jurisdictions that have
both adopted warranties and have consciously continued to resolve prem-
ises liability questions through use of traditional tort doctrine, all courts
seem to be struggling, consciously or unconsciously, with the same set of
questions. The degree to which one or more of these questions is empha-
sized in a particular case determines the direction that a particular court
will take.
While the formerly determinative control factor has diminished in im-
portance in many jurisdictions, it has not disappeared. Opinions still rec-
ognize the inherent unfairness in expecting a party to be responsible for
activity in an area outside that party's control. A frequently ignored ques-
tion is whether expectations regarding control have been altered by judi-
cially created or statutorily imposed warranties of habitability. Some
cases have addressed the question, finding that the landlord's duty carries
with it the inherent right to inspect and repair, thus giving the landlord the
requisite "control." And the URLTA specifically grants the landlord the
right to come to the premises "to inspect the premises, [and to] make
necessary ... repairs." 2 14 Tied closely to the control issue is the question
of the continuing importance of when the defect arose. The landlord's
degree of responsibility for repair seems the same whether the defect
arose before or after leasing. But regardless of how the responsibility
question is resolved, the fact remains that the landlord has greater access
210. See supra notes 163-75 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 176-205 and infra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
212. Lemley v. Penner, 230 Kan. 25, 630 P.2d 1086 (1981); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v.
Hewins, 6 Kan. App. 2d 259, 627 P.2d 1159 (1981); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304
(1974); Lillemoen v. Gregorich, 256 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. 1977).
213. Rivera v. Selfon Home Repairs & Improvements Co., 294 Pa. Super. 41, 439 A.2d 739
(1982); Fair v. Negley, 257 Pa. Super. 50, 390 A.2d 240 (1978); Beasley v. Freedman, 256 Pa.
Super. 208, 389 A.2d 1087 (1978); Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978).
214. URLTA § 3.103(a) (1972).
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to the premises prior to leasing. The tenant, on the other hand, never has
access to discover defects until after commencement of the lease.
All this is in turn related to a matter to which several courts have given
their attention-notice. Notice is, at least by analogy, a warranty-contract
doctrine, unrelated to tort. Yet even states with tort-based analyses fum-
ble with the difficulty of imposing liability without notice.
The contract-versus-tort difficulty also raises questions of waiver and
remedy. While presumably the contract-based warranty can be waived
without legislative authorization, the same cannot be said of exculpatory
clauses in residential leases. 215 The remedy problem is simply stated:
should one receive different damages depending upon which name a court
attaches to a landlord's failure to meet his responsibility?
The fundamental underlying issue is whether courts will approach
these problems as contract- or tort-based questions, especially with regard
to the degree of culpability courts will expect from the charged party. The
closer a court moves toward a traditional analysis, the more the conduct
of each party becomes relevant, and the more "fault" becomes the cen-
tral issue. A classic warranty analysis, on the other hand, would look
primarily to the agreement of the parties and ignore culpability questions.
The principal task for the court now is to determine which of these ap-
proaches, if either, offers a satisfactory framework for a fair and efficient
jurisprudence of premises liability.
VII. THE FOREST AND A PATH
While common issues can be found, in premises liability questions the
present farrago of traditional tort law, negligence, contract, and strict lia-
bility concepts has overwhelmed courts and commentators alike. Exam-
ples abound.
A. The Current Confusion
A few states have taken the curious position that traditional tort immu-
nity is entirely unaffected by a judicially or legislatively imposed duty
requiring landlords to guarantee habitability both before and after leas-
ing. 216 The Pennsylvania jumble of tort and contract ideas is impenetra-
ble. 217 But more widely accepted positions are equally, if less obviously,
unhelpful. The Massachusetts-Iowa view that tort damages are available
for breach of warranty both destroys the warranty analogy and
215. Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 321,325-27(1973).
216. Seesupranote212.
217. See supra note 213.
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discards centuries of distinction between tort and contract remedies. Even
the popular New Hampshire position, retaining negligence as the basic
standard while considering breach of warranty as evidence of negligence,
breaks down at the crucial point. The lead case states that the landlord's
degree of responsibility should be determined by the circumstances be-
cause "[i]t is appropriate that the landlord ...should bear the cost of
repairs necessary to make the premises safe," ' 218 a duty apparently
unqualified by fault.
The two principal commentators on these questions have also found the
task of appropriate resolution a mercurial one. 2 19 Professor Browder's re-
cent piece insightfully recognizes many of the substantive and semantic
traps within these issues, but in the end suggests that in most cases "the
breach [of the warranty of habitability] is a simple breach of contract, to
which the usual contract-tort relations produce liability for negli-
gence" 220-hardly a formula for eliminating confusion. In the other ma-
jor piece, Professor Love's otherwise superb exposition of the problem
collapses at the critical moment with a statement that typifies the wide-
spread muddle: "A failure to exercise caution in [discovering defects]
... will result in holding a landlord strictly liable." 221 In other words, if
one is negligent, one is strictly liable.
While the Restatement (Second) of Property makes some considerable
strides toward resolving these problems, it too fails in the end. The Re-
statement rule makes landlords responsible if they have both violated a
warranty of habitability or "a duty created by statute or administrative
regulation" and "failed to exercise reasonable care to repair ... [a dan-
gerous] condition." 222 This provision applies without regard to when the
condition arose. Further, the comments state that the landlord can only be
liable for conditions of which he was aware or should have been aware. 223
Tenant knowledge of dangerous conditions can be a defense under the
rubric of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk. 224
Nothing is inherently wrong with requiring an injured party to prove
both breach of contract (or violation of a statute) and negligence in order
to have a cause of action, although the requirement would never be con-
sidered the apotheosis of clarity. Greater problems lie with the infusion of
218. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528, 535 (1973) (quoting Kline v. Bums, 111
N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971)).
219. See Browder, The Taming of a Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REV 99
(1982); Love, supra note 7.
220. Browder, supra note 219, at 136.
221. Love, supra note 7, at 125.
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.6 (1976).
223. Id. comment c.
224. Id. comment b.
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the notion of "dangerousness" into the formula, as well as the Restate-
ment's unsatisfactory treatment of the notice question. "Dangerousness"
has already proved an elusive standard in its natural environment, 225 and
its injection into an area already plagued with rampant conceptual trou-
bles should not be welcomed. More basically, the requirement is not a
fair one. If a tenant or third party can prove (1) that the landlord breached
either a warranty of habitability or statutory duty, (2) that the landlord
was negligent in repairing a condition resulting from his breach, and (3)
that the failure caused personal injury, why, it is reasonable to ask,
should the landlord be able to defend the suit on the basis that the condi-
tion was not "dangerous"? What nondangerous conditions hurt people?
The Restatement comments are silent on the question.
The Restatement notice provisions are perplexing. The comments pro-
vide that the landlord can be held responsible only for conditions of which
he was or should have been aware "in the exercise of reasonable
care.' '226 A serious difficulty is evaded in the next sentence, which pro-
vides that "ordinarily" the landlord would be charged with notice of con-
ditions existing prior to leasing. 227
The related problem of tenant notice is also jumbled. One comment
indicates that a tenant's uncommunicated knowledge of a dangerous con-
dition does not necessarily prevent an action against the landlord. 228 The
following comment requires notice from the tenant within a reasonable
period of time to repair as a precondition to liability. 229 Also, to say that
uncommunicated knowledge should be allowed as a negligence-based de-
fense leaves unanswered the question of its effect on actions by third par-
ties, which by the terms of the comment are also covered. 230
B. A Possible Solution
The principal source of confusion in all of these approaches is the al-
most universal predisposition toward a fault-based jurisprudence, with
the accompanying fear of a system based on liability without regard to
fault, and the difficulty of squaring that predisposition with the contract-
225. See, e.g., Swartz, The Concepts of "Defective Condition" and "Unreasonably Danger-
ous" in Products Liability Law, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 280 (1983); Smith, Status of the "Unreasonably
Dangerous" Element In Product Liability Actions, 15 FORUM 706 (1980).
226. RESTATNiEENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.6 comment c (1976).
227. Id.
228. Id. comment b.
229. Id. comment c.
230. "The landlord remains subject to liability to the tenant or to others on the leased property
with the tenant's consent, but he has available all the usual defenses to an action in negligence,
including contributory negligence and assumption of risk." Id. comment b.
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based language of warranty. As one reviews the wreckage, it becomes
evident that two related but distinct problems infect the area: first, what
should the law be? and second, what should the law be called? The for-
mer question is, of course, more important, though the latter has revealed
a significant capacity to create chaos. We believe that the proper solution
to the substantive problem would go far in eliminating its nomenclatural
partner.
The current system should be reformed, either judicially or legisla-
tively, by abandoning the flawed and often indecipherable negligence-
based system and moving toward a more predictable and fairer system
built around three critical factors common to all premises liability ques-
tions: whether or not the condition was discoverable, when it arose, and
whether it was located on or off the premises. The first of these questions,
we believe, is crucial to resolution of the substantive difficulties. The
other two are helpful primarily in creating a proper nomenclature. This
suggestion is not a call for a return to an eighteenth-century, outcome-
determinative categorization. It is rather a claim that much of the struggle
over the past fifteen years in premises liability questions has been caused
by the courts' failure to recognize that vastly different policies and ques-
tions of equity concern the area depending upon how these three factors
are rotated through a matrix.
1. Discoverable Conditions
The most important of the factors, and the only logical starting place
for a discussion of them, is the question of whether or not the condition
was discoverable. If so, four possibilities follow. The condition might
have been (1) off the premises, discoverable before leasing; (2) off the
premises, discoverable after leasing; (3) on the premises, discoverable
before leasing; or (4) on the premises, discoverable after leasing.
A landlord should be liable without regard to fault for damages or inju-
ries from discoverable conditions off the premises, whether those arose
before or after leasing. That was basically the position of the common
law, 231 and to apply to off-premises cases a "totality of circumstances"
negligence test simply invites both confusion and unfairness. We believe
that the landlord should also be liable without fault for discoverable con-
ditions on the premises at the time of leasing. This is arguably a close
question, because the tenant theoretically has had an opportunity to in-
spect for such conditions. But placing the responsibility with the landlord
23 1. See W. PROSSER. supra note 4, § 63, at 405-08; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 360
(1965); Love, supra note 7, at 65-68.
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tracks with both modem views of the relative skills and resources of the
two parties, 232 and modem sale-of-goods law on the same question. 233
The landlord should also be liable for discoverable defects on the prem-
ises that arose after leasing, but only if he has received proper notice.
These are the cases that seem to occur most frequently, and are the type
that courts have in mind when they devise the rules they then blindly ap-
ply to all cases. These are also the cases that have created much con-
ceptual difficulty on the part of thoughtful courts and commentators who
consider the apparent unfairness of liability without notice. 234 The
thoughtful parties are correct; such liability is unfair. While courts or
legislatures can grant landlords all the access imaginable, the fact remains
that the tenant will spend a great deal more time on the premises than the
landlord could or should. While harsh results are always possible with a
strict notice requirement, to require the tenant to assume some responsi-
bility seems more equitable and reasonable than to require the landlord to
make frequent, intrusive inspections, rendering the landlord liable for
conditions about which the tenant may well have known and yet not com-
municated.
Thus, so long as landlords receive notice of on-premises conditions
that arise after leasing, they are responsible without regard to fault for
foreseeable damages and injuries caused by all biscoverable conditions.
Once that conclusion is reached, assigning appropriate names to the land-
lord's obligations becomes less difficult.
The landlord is responsible for all discoverable conditions arising prior
to leasing. It is quite proper, even helpful, then, to pronounce that the
landlord warrants against such conditions. Like other warranties, the
warranty of habitability is a contractual undertaking, implied from the
circumstances of the transaction. Like other warranties, a breach of the
warranty of habitability is determined without regard to fault. The finding
of such a breach leads to recovery for all foreseeable consequential dam-
ages, including personal injuries. 235
232. The Javins court noted:
[T]oday's city dweller usually has a single, specialized skill unrelated to maintenance work; he
is unable to make repairs like the "jack-of-all-trades" farmer who was the common law's model
of the lessee . . . . In addition, the increasing complexity of today's dwellings renders them
much more difficult to repair than the structures of earlier times.
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 915
(1970).
233. Failure to inspect is not a defense to a breach of wananty claim. U.C.C. § 2-314 official
comment 13 (1981).
234. See, e.g., Love, supra note 7, at 105.
235. J. CALAMARI & J. PERi.LO, THE LAw OF CoNTRAcrs § 223 (1970); U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b)
(1981).
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Cases involving discoverable defects arising after the tenant takes pos-
session are only slightly more difficult. It has been said that for conditions
arising after the lease the warranty is more accurately described as a
promise to repair. That is correct but incomplete-another reflection of
the fact that statements on these questions usually arise from cases con-
cerning on-premises conditions. The promise is more accurately one to
"maintain and repair." These are different undertakings. To "repair"
connotes that effort needed to fix a condition that is brought to one's at-
tention. To "maintain" connotes an ongoing obligation unrelated to in-
formation about defects. If the landlord fails to maintain common areas or
other off-premises locations, and discoverable conditions cause damage
or injury, the landlord has breached his covenant to maintain. He is then
responsible to the tenant or third party for both actual and foreseeable
consequential damages arising from his breach. Similarly, after notice
from the tenant, the landlord is liable for breach of his implied covenant
to repair discoverable defects which arise on the premises. Again, this
contract-based analysis requires no inquiry into the culpability of the
landlord's action beyond evidence of breach.
2. Undiscoverable Defects
The beauty and symmetry of any formula regarding discoverable de-
fects dissolves when applied to undiscoverable ones. There are several
reasons for this. It is quite possible to allocate responsibility for discover-
able defects between the landlord and the tenant. The same is not true for
undiscoverable defects, a point frequently overlooked in discussions of
premises liability questions. If the task were limited merely to allocation
of responsibility, it would be easy. A superior knowledge of the kinds of
structural or system-related conditions likely to be the source of undis-
closed conditions, the long-term incentive to maintain against such occur-
rences, and a better knowledge of and access to insurance all lead to the
conclusion that the landlord should be responsible.
However, to analyze this responsibility for undiscoverable defects in
the language of "fault" is nonsense. Two previous writers on the subject
understand this. Professor Love, while not distinguishing between dis-
coverable and undiscoverable conditions, opts for a Louisiana-like strict
liability modified by certain cause-related defenses. 236 Professor Brow-
der, making the discoverable-undiscoverable distinction, adheres to the
Kaplan court view of the appropriateness of strict liability because of the
landlord's ability to insure. 237 The Old Town case also recognizes many
236. Love, supra note 7, at 157-58.
237. Browder, supra note 219, at 135-5 1.
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of the same arguments while concluding that an intermediate court of ap-
peals does not have the prerogative to make such a choice. 238
Even after deciding that liability, if any, must be unrelated to fault, one
still must face the question of whether this liability arises from tort or
contract. While doctrinally the differences can be made to disappear,
there are such theoretical distinctions to be drawn as the need for "dan-
gerousness," the possible requirement of notice, and the chance for
waiver. None of the concepts, however, is especially useful in undiscov-
erable condition cases. We have already alluded to the apparent useless-
ness of dangerousness even in cases in which a manufacturer has made
the goods and placed them in the stream of commerce. 239 To put the same
limitation on a situation usually involving a structure built decades ago
that has changed hands on both the ownership and rental side many times
is not helpful at all. Nor does it make any sense to discuss the question of
notice for conditions that are by definition undiscoverable. And while
waiver is theoretically possible, once the burden has been allocated the
ability to transfer it would either be the result of price bargaining between
the parties or, far more likely, a very lopsided bargain favoring the land-
lord.
The problem then is to settle upon a terminology to apply to the sensi-
ble conclusion that somebody should be liable and that that somebody
should be the landlord. Our view, again, is that warranty is the better
theory. Use of a contract-based view avoids both the confusing difficulty
of employing different standards for discoverable and undiscoverable de-
fects, and the difficulties of "dangerousness." The notice problem dis-
solves upon analysis because notice is, by definition, impossible.
That leaves the problem of waiver. In most jurisdictions this will al-
ready have been disposed of either judicially or legislatively. If the land-
lord's warranty cannot be waived in reference to his economic relation-
ships with the tenant,240 to allow the landlord to waive responsibility for
injury or damage is certainly unreasonable. Further, this position is con-
sistent with the doctrine that one cannot waive responsibility for breach of
public duties,24' because the substance of the warranty in many cases will
likely be derived from local housing codes. Finally, the inability to waive
comports with the growing line of cases outside contract law that hold
238. Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 776 (Ind. App. 1976), appeal dis-
missed, 267 Ind. 176, 369 N.E.2d 404 (1977).
239. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
240. Cunningham, supra note 144, at 95.
241. "The duties imposed by the Housing Regulations may not be waived or shifted by agree-
ment if the Regulations specifically place the duty upon the lessor." Javins, 428 F.2d at 1081-82.
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that exculpatory clauses in residential premises liability cases are highly
disfavored.242
3. Reprise
We suggest, therefore, that the landlord be liable to the tenant, the ten-
ant's guest, or other third parties for damage or injury arising out of the
landlord's breach of the warranty of habitability, or the landlord's breach
of a continuing covenant to repair or maintain. The only exception to this
rule would be that, for discoverable defects arising on the premises after
the tenant takes possession, discovery by the landlord or reasonably
prompt notice to the landlord by the tenant would be a prerequisite to
landlord liability. This general approach gives each party to the agree-
ment a clear notion of his or her responsibilities, reduces the number of
facts to be determined, and greatly decreases the flexibility of judges and
juries to mandate different results on virtually identical sets of facts. It is
easy to administer, predictable, and seems as fair a solution as is practica-
ble.
On the fairness question, one legal and two practical aspects justify
what appears to be a lean away from the landlord and toward the tenant.
First, undiscoverable conditions are not likely to occur frequently, so the
responsibility beyond self-help is not as drastic as it may seem. Second,
both Professor Love and Professor Browder's surveys indicate the availa-
bility of insurance which, while it should not be the deciding factor, is a
comforting one and a secondary policy reason for choosing the landlord
as risk spreader. 243 Finally, the foreseeable damages arising from the
breach of the contract, while including property damage and personal in-
jury, will be somewhat more restricted than would be the case in a tort-
based action. 244
We believe the impetus for these changes should come from the legis-
latures. The changes are sweeping enough in most instances to prohibit
reliance on judicial activity in virtually any jurisdiction. In the dozen or
so years in which the warranty of habitability question has been an active
issue, only a few jurisdictions have had enough cases reach the appellate
courts to form any kind of jurisprudential configuration. Also, whether
the courts pay attention to them or not, most states have some form of
duty-creating statute directly affecting these questions. We recommend
that the legislatures tinker with those statutes in an effort to set aside the
242. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
243. Browder, supra note 219, at 138-39; Love, supra note 7, at 116-17.
244. 5 A. CORBIN. CONTRACTS § 1019 (1964).
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current morass of premises liability questions and set out a clear, under-
standable, and fair system for landlords and tenants alike.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The law of premises liability has undergone considerable upheaval
over the last two decades. The result of these changes is yet to be deter-
mined in many states. A change common to several jurisdictions has been
the process of relegating the issue of control, formerly the decisive ele-
ment, to a humbler, perhaps incidental, status. In place of the traditional
rule of landlord immunity has sprung a variety of positions, as notions of
contract, warranty, negligence, and strict liability have all come to play a
role. Some key questions remain in a state of flux, including the necessity
of notice, the role of fault, the effectiveness of waiver, and the measure of
damages. The disposition of these and other issues depends heavily, per-
haps ultimately, on the theory of liability employed by the particular
court.
The present quagmire is due in large part to the courts' failure to recog-
nize that different theories compel different policies and conclusions. By
adopting a negligence test, for example, a court is effectively taking the
position that the conduct of the parties is the crucial issue. Culpability is
less important, and notice more important, under a contract or warranty
theory. Confusion and uncertainty result when courts blithely invoke a
doctrine by name without paying heed to the full range of policies and
conclusions compelled by that doctrine.
In this article, we have attempted to assess the merits of the different
positions of the courts by pointing out their shortcomings and inconsisten-
cies and by identifying the different theories available to them. In the end,
our goal has been to present an alternative, a system that would explicitly
recognize the importance of the key factors: the discoverability, location,
and time of onset of the particular defect. Our position is that a blanket
rule will not suffice, and that fairness and reason require differing conclu-
sions, depending on the interplay of these three key factors. The result is
a system that is fair, predictable, and truly reflective of the modem rela-
tionship between landlord and tenant.
